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INNOVATION, COMPETTION AND PUBLIC 







Should the supply or the demand side bear the risk connected to innovation? The two 
polar cases identified in the literature are the supply push and the demand pull. The 
former is the typical one, with the supplier bearing the costs and obtaining the benefits 
from innovating. The latter is technology procurement, where the buyer takes the risk, by 
procuring the innovative good or service. With respect to this, pre-commercial 
procurement is a peculiar solution that can explain the debate found in the literature 
relative to its configuration either as a supply-side or a demand-side instrument. The 
separation from the commercial phase allows the procurer to take only (part of) the risks 
connected to R&D services. Also, competition among suppliers gives the opportunity of 
evaluating different solutions and to obtain, in the commercial phase, a lower price for 
the innovative good. The counterpart of all this is a large portion of risk being left to the 
supplier. As a consequence, suppliers need to obtain a larger share of the benefits of the 
innovation process. This economic reason, besides the legal restrictions on State aid, 
explains the need for a shared risks-shared benefits approach, centred on the agreements 
on the assignment of IPRs. 
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Innovation as such refers to not yet existing markets and therefore, to interactions among 
agents not only through price signals. 
Under this respect, the fundamental theoretical reference is Schumpeter’s (1975) idea of 
competition: innovation itself is a more decisive instrument than prices in gaining an 
advantage over rivals. Innovation, in fact, can grant a temporary monopoly power and the 
resulting extraordinary profits that compensate the costs of research and development 
(R&D). These include the costs stemming from technological uncertainty, regarding the 
development cost function, and market uncertainty, on when and if a rival innovation will 
appear and on the profitability of the innovation (price of substitutes and competing 
innovations, etc.). 
In this perspective, the producer-seller takes the initiative to innovate, while the demand 
side is characterised by routine behaviour and limited foresight. In particular, demand 
must be induced externally through the seller’s marketing activity. Of course, the 
innovation will be driven by consumers’ (new) needs, but producers have the role to 
detect and meet them. The reason for this is that information, exclusion and transaction 
costs hinder the articulation of demand. Thus, market power, not simply in the usual 
meaning of price fixing, but in the sense of being able to take the initiative to innovate, 
rests with the supply side. As a consequence, the producer bears the risks and catches the 
opportunities of innovating. 
There are, however, situations in which the above sketched process does not work: the 
producer does not take the initiative to deliver a potentially Pareto-improving innovation, 
typically because the market risk is too high. Can consumers substitute in for the sellers? 
Or should the government intervene because of the hindrances that affect also the 
demand side? 
This paper retraces the literature on innovation to evaluate the theoretical rationales for 
a particular policy instrument, pre commercial procurement (PCP). Section 2 sketches the 
main issues of the traditional and of the new market failure perspectives, the former 
centred on the relationship between innovation and market structure, the latter 
extending the analysis of a firm’s ability to innovate beyond the choice of R&D 
investment. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the literature on the role of the demand side in 
general and of innovation procurement in particular, while section 5 the rationales for 
government intervention in the form of innovation procurement. Section 6 applies the 
results of the literature to the evaluation of PCP, while section 7 analyses the role of IPRs 
management in the functioning of this policy instrument, also on the basis of recent 
experiences. Section 8 summarises the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Innovation and market failure  
The traditional market failure perspective is centred on the instances of under-provision 
of R&D (Arrow, 1962).  
The first one is the public good nature of scientific knowledge and the consequent 
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imperfect appropriability of R&D results, together with the non rivalness in the use of 
knowledge; the positive externality of new knowledge makes social returns from 
innovating exceed private ones, with the consequence that the market fails to provide the 
socially optimal level (and direction) of R&D. Then, there are the high fixed costs of R&D 
and the resulting economies of scale, which create an incentive to monopolise. Finally, 
investment in R&D presents major sources of technological and market uncertainty, 
beyond those normally affecting the entrepreneurial activity. The profitability of an 
innovation depends on technical difficulties, on the nature and timing of competing 
innovations, etc., which are not known in advance. Reducing or mitigating the effects of 
uncertainty is costly (for instance, both technical and market uncertainty can be reduced 
by developing alternative research efforts). Uncertainty can in principle be separated 
from the profits from innovation by selling shares in the project. However, asymmetric 
information, especially in the form of moral hazard, can involve under-provision of funds 
and, as a consequence, of innovative activity. 
The market remedy to these problems is a departure from perfect competition, according 
to Schumpeter’s vision: innovation activity is stimulated by the anticipation of monopoly 
profits for being the unique producer of the good. These can be achieved only by 
preventing, at least temporarily, imitation, by means of erecting barriers to entry (buy up 
of raw materials, control of distribution channels, building up of reputation and identity, 
realisation of economies of scale). 
Alternatively, in addressing market failure, the government can grant IPRs (patent, 
trademark, copyright, etc.). The problem is to design them in such a way as to weigh the 
short-run efficiency loss from monopoly with the long-run gain from innovation. The way 
in which the expectation of some extraordinary profits should be preserved in order not 
to discourage innovation reveals the conflict between individual and collective welfare 
that is at the heart of the problem. The monopoly profits required to finance innovation 
activity last until imitation succeeds. Therefore, the innovator’s interest is to be the only 
producer of the new good as long as possible. Society, instead, would benefit from the 
diffusion of innovation. But imposing to disclose production secrets or barring monopoly 
could prevent investment in innovation at the detriment of society itself. 
In principle, society could obtain the competitive market outcome compensating the 
monopolist-innovator for the loss of profits. Until exclusion and transaction costs make 
this solution impossible, one faces a trade-off between short and long-run efficiency. 
Patent laws accept it by allowing temporary extraordinary profits, not to discourage 
innovation and loose the increase in welfare that society will experience once its results 
will be public.  
In some sense, the temporal trade-off also marks the nature of the temporary profits from 
innovation. In fact, in a short-run perspective, they are the result of above marginal cost 
pricing, and, as such, they are linked to a dead-weight loss. However, in a long-run, 
backward perspective, they represent the compensation for the uncertainty of the 
profitability of the innovation. As long as they remunerate this, they are not extra-profits. 
A deeper insight can be obtained by considering their essentially temporary nature. 
Profits will attract imitation and competing innovations, which will wipe them away. If 
this is true in general, it is particularly so in the realm of innovation, where possible rivals 
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can appear from different industries, and against which the barriers erected by the 
monopolist can be rather weak. One could say that the possibility of innovation makes a 
market much more contestable than otherwise. Potential competition, as known, will 
discipline the monopolist’s price fixing behaviour. Thus, no extra-revenues beyond those 
remunerating production costs (inclusive of the remuneration for risk taking) could in 
principle be obtained. Moreover, innovation can be triggered not just by the allure of 
monopoly profits, but by the fear that others might displace the firm’s present products. 
From the entrepreneur’s perspective, the innovation activity might be just an alternative 
to imitation not to be excluded from the market. 
As noted by Kamien and Schwartz (1982) in their review of the relationship between 
market structure and innovation, another source of interaction between innovation and 
market power originates from the possession of monopoly power on present products, 
which would make it easier to extend it to new products (for instance, through the 
command over distribution channels, through the firm’s unique identity, through the 
threat of retaliation in the event of innovation from rivals, through other actions made 
possible by its dominant position). Under this respect, a monopolist should be more 
willing to innovate than a firm with no market power. Moreover, given the difficulty in 
finding external financing because of the problem of asymmetric information, monopoly 
profits could be used as a source of internal financing. 
However, if, on the one hand, the possession of monopoly power makes it easier to 
perform and reap the benefits from innovating, on the other hand, it makes it less 
necessary. The incentive to innovate can be weakened by the presence of X-inefficiencies 
(preference for additional leisure with respect to additional profits (Leibenstein, 1966). 
Moreover, Arrow (1962) and Usher (1964) noted that profits from innovating are only 
the difference between monopoly profits from current products and perspective profits 
from the new ones for the incumbent, while they would be the whole amount of the latter 
for a new entrant. 
One can also notice that, in a process of competition through innovation, not just the 
allure of extraordinary profits, but the fear that rivals could innovate and displace the 
firm’s current product can be an incentive for investing in the development of new goods. 
This incentive would be weaker for a monopolist, if, as argued by Baldwin and Childs 
(1969), market power allows the firm to be a “fast second” in imitating a successful 
product. One can add that the prevision of such a reaction would reduce the incentive to 
innovate also for the newcomers.1  
The superiority of monopoly with respect to perfect competition in the provision of 
innovation does not seem, therefore, theoretically grounded. The same conclusion applies 
to the hypothesis of a positive relation between innovation and firm size. 
Elaborating on Schumpeter’s work, Galbraith formulated the hypothesis according to 
which firm size is positively associated to innovation activity. This is because innovation 
is expensive and large firms can exploit economies of scale in R&D. Empirical tests have, 
however, shown that economies of scale are present only within a small scale and that, in 
                                                                    
1
 We will return to this point when dealing with the design of IPRs in PCP in relation with the 
separation between the commercial and pre-commercial phase. 
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proportional terms, large firms spend less than small ones. 
The Schumpeterian hypotheses have stimulated new theories of market structure, that 
have analysed the factors affecting the speed of innovation in a decision theoretic 
framework (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982), finding that an intermediate intensity of rivalry 
yields the fastest pace of innovation. On this basis, the analysis of the relationship 
between market structure and innovation has been conducted in a game theoretical 
framework, with the intensity of rivalry an endogenous factor. With respect to social 
optimality, the result is that market solutions are inefficient. 
More recently, new perspectives on innovation have extended the analysis of the 
determinants of a firm’s ability to innovate beyond the amount of investment in R&D. A 
particular emphasis has been put on systemic and institutional aspects of innovation and 
on the learning process by firms, giving birth to the national innovation system literature 
(Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall and Borràs, 1997). Therefore, typologies of 
market failures other than those related to the properties of scientific knowledge have 
been identified. 
Smith (2000) identifies four types of failure: failures in the provision of infrastructures 
(underinvestment in physical – e.g., communications and transports – and science-
technology infrastructures – e.g., universities, laboratories); transition failures (firms use 
the technology they know best, but are not competent in technologies applied in related 
areas); lock-in failures (firms are locked in a particular technological paradigm or 
trajectory, because of high entry costs connected to the adoption of new technologies 
when a dominant design exists, of high switching costs for users, etc.; the problem is 
related to the existence of network externalities); institutional failures (slow changing 
norms and values on the consumers’ side, together with unexpected negative effects of 
the regulatory context on the innovation system). 
Malerba (2002) points at five types of failures: learning failures (firms are unable to learn 
rapidly and effectively); exploration-exploitation trade-off (firms specialise in either of 
them, while the two activities should be balanced); variety-selection trade-off (as before); 
appropriability traps; complementarities failures. 
Lundvall and Borràs (1997) reformulate Smith’s and Malerba’s typologies into three 
trade-offs: i) the exploration-exploitation dilemma, with firms often pursuing incremental 
innovation rather than radical one, at the advantage of innovation dissemination, but at 
the cost of lock-in failures; ii) the integration-flexibility dilemma: integration can avoid 
transition, complementarities and learning failures, at the cost of being locked in a given 
trajectory; iii) the diversity-harmonisation dilemma: the incentive for harmonising and 
standardising technologies and institutions to exploit the economies of scale available in 
the globalised learning economy is at odds with the importance of diversity as a source of 
learning. 
As issues of system failure become relevant, the role of government widens to include 
institutional design and firms’ ability to learn and connect. Actually, Smith’s and 
Malerba’s typologies refer to the aims to be pursued by public policy (Economic Policy 
Committee, 2002). Thus, failures in infrastructure provision call for incentives and 
subsidies for private provision or direct public provision; lock-in failures for policies 
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favouring technological alternatives; learning failures for human capital programmes, 
support for industrial R&D, public procurement, dissemination policies; the exploitation-
exploration trade-off for policies keeping technological rivalry open, through public 
procurement, support to universities, and the like, as well as support of entry and 
survival of new firms, to allow diversity within the industry, and of variety through a 
common infrastructure (standardisation) and better dissemination of codified 
information; the variety-selection trade-off for antitrust, industrial and technological 
policies to allow market competition; complementarities failure for the provision of 
connections (R&D networks, industry-university cooperation, etc.). 
In synthesis, the system failure literature looks at R&D investment as one of the several 
activities of the innovation process, which can be performed in various phases. It is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the marketing of a new product. Thus, 
attention is driven to all aspects of the innovation process, emphasising also the role of 
the users of innovation both in its generation and in its diffusion. 
 
3. Technology push, demand pull and the innovation cycle 
The literature on the microeconomics of technical progress has developed the 
technology-push and the demand-pull hypotheses, based on two different views of the 
relation between a firm’s research department and its marketing department. 
According to the technology-push hypothesis, the initiative of the innovation comes from 
the researchers. This implies that advances in scientific knowledge are the key element of 
the innovative process.  
According to the demand-pull hypothesis (see Godin and Lane, 2013, for a history of the 
model), instead, the initiative comes from the marketing staff. Innovation is responsive to 
demand-pull factors (Schmookler, 1996; Griliches and Schmookler, 1963; Mayers and 
Marquis, 1969), since it depends on profitability that, in turn, depends on market demand 
and market size. 
Even if developed in the attempt to verify Schumpeter’s hypotheses, the demand-pull 
approach appears in contrast with his idea that the demand-side is characterised by 
routine behaviour and limited foresight, with the consequence that market demand alone 
has little potential to stimulate innovations unless users’ preferences are influenced by 
the firms. 
According to Mowery and Rosenberg (1979), the empirical studies finding that 
innovation is responsive to demand-pull factors use a too broad definition of demand. 
The existence of an adequate demand is, of course, necessary, but the role of supply-side 
factors cannot be overlooked. Technological opportunity and market demand are both 
necessary for an innovation to result. 
The demand-pull hypothesis appears to be a complementary explanation of technological 
advantage; it has highlighted the role of demand conditions in generating and diffusing 
innovation. A strong emphasis has been put on the role of early users and sophisticated 
demand to take up innovation and influence other consumers. In particular, von Hippel 
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(1986) has introduced the notion of lead users, agents who face needs that will be general 
in the marketplace time ahead of the rest of the market and who can benefit significantly 
by obtaining a solution to those needs. 
Thus, the positive interaction between innovative customers and innovative users can be 
said to represent a positive, demand driven effect (Lundvall, 1988; Antonelli e Gehringer, 
2015). Also, the relationship between demand and market structure has been analysed 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Sutton, 1991 and 1988), as well as the role of communities 
of practice (Harhoff et al., 2003; Franke and Shah, 2003) and of co-invention (Bresnahan 
and Greenstein, 2001) – for a review, see Malerba, 2007. This literature has provided new 
insights in the mechanisms of the innovation cycle, which have shed light on the relation 
between market structure and innovation, on the one hand, and on the role of users in the 
innovation process, on the other hand. 
Utterback and Suarez (1993) consider the two-way causation direction between market 
structure and technological change: a greater degree of competition implies more rapid 
rates of technological change, while a rapidly evolving technology attracts new firms into 
the industry. This link is not in contrast to Schumpeter’s view; on the contrary, it is in line 
with his creative destruction hypothesis. 
Utterback and Suarez distinguish three technology phases. The first one, the technology 
competition phase, precedes the emergence of a dominant design. It starts with the 
synthesis of a new product by one or a few firms that acquire a temporary monopoly 
situation in the niches where they possess the most relevant performance advantages. 
They are followed by a wave of new entrants, each with a variation of the product. These 
firms are often small and come from outside the industry in question. 
In the transitory phase, a dominant design appears and matures as a production concept. 
Firms, large or small, that succeed in making the transition to product standardisation 
thanks to process innovation and integration, or that merge with successful firms thanks 
to some special resources, can compete effectively and acquire dominance. 
After the emergence of a dominant design, there is a wave of exits, until a point of 
stability is reached, with a few firms sharing the market. They are typically large firms, 
with standardised or slightly differentiated products and relatively stable market shares. 
Also a few small firms may remain in some particular segments, but they typically display 
little growth potential. 
How are the dimension and number of firms connected to technological advance? 
Utterback and Suarez (1993) and Muller and Tilton (1969) report that major innovations 
are not necessarily linked to large absolute size or market power; rather, they are often 
developed by new entrants in the market or market segment. Moreover, with respect to 
the innovation phases, the technological process is slow in the very first period, when 
firms are few, while it speeds up as the number of entrants increases. This feature can be 
linked to the externalities inherent to scientific knowledge. The increase in the number of 
firms implies more experimentation, providing feedbacks about products and market 
requirements. 
Along with the emergence of a dominant design, however, research becomes more 
specialised and the innovation effort concentrates on particular technical aspects. 
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Technological progress slows down, production techniques become standardised, the 
cost of production equipment increases with process integration, variable costs decrease, 
so that firms with large market shares benefit from further expansion. Eventually, a 
stable condition is reached with a few firms dominating the market. 
With reference to the relation between innovation and market structure, the analysis of 
the innovation process appears to identify two different situations. 
In the initial phase, when a major innovation is developed by a firm, this acquires a 
position of market power, being the unique seller of a product. The profits associated to 
this monopolistic position are not linked to size and are temporary: firms imitating or 
introducing variants of the product soon enter the market eroding the initial innovator’s 
position. 
This is not, however, the end of the story: the innovation process leads to the emergence 
of a dominant design; the standardisation of production techniques and the presence of 
economies of scale, then, typically determines the dominance of a few large firms. Profits 
in this phase are, therefore, of a different nature with respect to those obtained by initial 
innovators, deriving from barriers that are other than being the unique producer. 
Moreover, the phase in which profits directly derive from the innovative activity does not 
discourage entry, which is connected to an intense process and product development 
period. On the contrary, profits in the later phase are connected to a period of slow 
technological progress. This can be linked to the observation (Arrow, 1962) that the 
indivisibility of knowledge can be embodied in a factor, for instance, instrumental goods. 
A monopolist may try to protect the investment in the existing equipment by delaying the 
introduction of new technologies. In a competitive industry, instead, once a new, superior 
technology has been adopted by one firm, the other ones are compelled to adopt, if they 
want to remain in the market. 
There seem to be two different market structures, both associated to profits, but of 
different nature. Firms obtaining profits in the first phase do not necessarily coincide 
with firms obtaining profits in the second one, even if Utterback and Suarez (1993) note 
that successful firms usually enter the industry in the early phase. The question is 
whether the producer is willing to take the risks connected to innovation only in view of 
the “overall” profits they can gain, including those deriving from the possession of 
dominance in the last phase. We shall return to this point when dealing with innovation 
failure and with the role of public procurement and, in particular, PCP in addressing 
them. 
The analysis of the technological phases is also important in better defining the role of the 
demand side in the innovation process. In particular, during the technology competition 
phase, the insight into users’ needs is the key innovation factor and, on a parallel, the 
users’ lack of perception of the relevance of the innovation can be a major problem. In the 
transitory phase, a production concept often emerges through the procurement decision 
of early adopters. In the specific phase, demand selects alternative development 
trajectories (Kuhn, 1962; Dosi, 1982). 
Malerba et al. (2007) present a model of the influence of differences in consumers’ 
preferences on the industry life cycle: heterogeneity in demand can break the dominance 
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of an older technology allowing a new, superior technology to win the market. The key 
hypothesis is that new products must be developed and perfected to meet potential 
demand. Moreover, there is a direct relationship between the product market share and 
the likelihood that a consumer will buy it. If a new product reaches the market quality 
threshold requirements, it competes with old, developed products that are at higher than 
threshold levels and have a large market share. If consumers are sophisticated, in the 
sense that they buy the best product available in each period, the new technology does 
not break in. The lock-in can be broken if there are experimental users, i.e. users who 
attribute an extrinsic merit to the product just because it is new, or if heterogeneity of 
preferences exists, that is, some consumers highly value a characteristic at a threshold 
that is not achievable by the old technology. 
This literature helps in analysing the role of demand in the innovation process, as directly 
addressed in the literature on innovation procurement. 
 
4. The consumer as the active player in the innovation process: innovation 
procurement 
Innovation involves uncertainty, both for producers and consumers. Since a market does 
not exist, interactions must take place through signals other than prices. The initiative to 
innovate is generally taken by producers, e.g. through market research. Producers face 
technical and market uncertainty (on the development cost function, on the time a “rival” 
innovation will appear, on the profitability of the innovation). Nevertheless, market 
control is on their side, so that they can more easily overcome information, exclusion and 
transaction costs. As exposed above, expected profits are the trigger of the process. 
There are, however, cases in which uncertainty is too high to rely upon the producer’s 
initiative. In particular, potentially welfare increasing innovation will not be undertaken 
without the assurance of future demand as an incentive to undertake a sufficient R&D 
investment level. 
In such cases, consumers could take the initiative, typically specifying the requirements 
of the desired new good and ordering it (innovation procurement). This corresponds to a 
shift of the risks from the producer to the consumer. The possibility of taking the 
initiative rests upon the possession of some market control (information, ability of 
reaping the advantage of innovation, coordination among buyers, etc.). This depends on 
the users’ characteristics (e.g., knowledge and sophistication) and on the structure of the 
demand side. The two aspects are interrelated in the case of markets with need for a high 
initial investment level in R&D and production, since the structure of the demand side 
influences the possibility of articulating demand for a quantity sufficient to encourage 
investment.2 
Technology, or, according to the most recent denomination, innovation procurement has 
                                                                    
2
 One can contrast such situations with the cases of open source software or cellular phone 
applications, with the demand pull taking the form of a direct participation of users in the 
innovation process as a source of continuous change (for the phenomena of the communities 
of practice, see Harhoff et al., 2003; Franke and Shah, 2003). 
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been extensively analysed in the literature (see Edquist and Hommen, 1998, for both a 
review and a systematic treatment of the issue), in the framework of the inability of pure 
markets to generate product innovation (Lundvall, 1985). 
Grandstand (1984) considers the problem of articulating demand within a transaction 
costs framework. Technology procurement is a special form of buyer-seller interaction, in 
which the customer takes the active role. This situation is between the two polar cases of 
a fully integrated organisation and of no integration. In the former, the buyer is integrated 
backwards into R&D and production for internal use; in the latter, the seller takes the 
active role within the usual market organisation. 
Technology procurement is associated to the specification of technical requirements, 
which reduces technological and commercial risks for the seller. The most famous 
example is perhaps the cooperation between Toyota and Nippon Steel (Hellman, 1993; 
Edquist and Hommen, 1998), which led to an innovation in the steel industry in 1983. 
Cooperation in R&D started with a simple contract that translated into an agreement on 
the exploitation of research results before large scale production. According to the 
agreement, Nippon Steel would license the patent right for its new product to other 
Japanese steel makers, though remaining the only Toyota’s supplier for 18 months. 
Therefore, Toyota got the long-run benefit of competitive sourcing. Nippon Steel 
benefited from the growth of the industry stimulated by innovation. Edquist and 
Hommen (1998) derive two main conclusions from this experience. First, competitive 
relations between a supplier and a customer are not in contrast with long-run 
cooperation in R&D.3 Second, the lack of this kind of relationships may hinder innovation, 
as in the case of the US car industry that they cite. 
The conditions for innovation procurement to be an effective way of stimulating 
innovation relate to market structure and technology life-cycle. 
As for market structure, Arrow (1962) analysed the influence on innovation of the 
structure of the demand side of the market, stimulating a vast literature (see Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1982, for a review of the seminal contributions) that developed an alternative 
version of the demand-pull hypothesis. Rothwell and Zellweg (1982) and Edquist and 
Hommen (1998) consider three main types of market structure: monopsony, polypsony 
and oligopsony.  
In a monopolistic market, demand pull, or buying power, is potentially at its highest level. 
There can be, however, two problems for innovation in such a situation. The first one is 
that the monopsonist chooses only one supplier. This could be the one with an inferior 
technology and even become a monopolist thanks to the procurement decision. The 
second problem arises if the monopsonist is a monopolist in another market, when 
innovation gives the way to product standardization. The most famous example of this is 
given by AT&T, which dominated the US telecommunication market until the 
deregulation of the sector. 
AT&T’s need for smaller and more efficient switches was the demand pull leading to the 
development of transistors at Bell Laboratories (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). However, 
lack of rivalry eventually weakened the need for innovative inputs (Porter, 1990). The 
                                                                    
3
 We will return to this issue when dealing with PCP. 
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tendency was reversed after the break-up of AT&T that followed deregulation.  
An assessment of the overall effect of deregulation on innovation should, however, 
consider the weakening of the demand pull deriving from the loss of monopsonistic 
power. In Europe, the break-up of old state-monopolies, acting as monopsonists of 
intermediate goods in the telecommunications, railway and energy sectors, has been 
considered a potential threat to innovation because of the dissolution of interactions with 
private suppliers (European Commission, 2006). The issue can be linked to the so called 
European paradox, that is, the inability of EU countries to deliver marketable innovations 
despite their technological and scientific excellence. 
It should be noted that the negative effect of the lack of rivalry in the final sales market 
does not exist when the monopsonist is the final user of the good. However, markets for 
consumer goods usually have a polypsonistic structure, which means that market control, 
and, with it, the initiative to innovate are with the supply side. The lack of consumer 
competence is usually a major hindrance.4 In some cases, this might call for a government 
representation of users (see below). 
The literature (among others, Edquist and Hommen, 1998, and Porter, 1990) identifies in 
oligopsony the market structure most favourable to innovation procurement, since it 
avoids the drawbacks of the lack of rivalry, though maintaining high levels of buying 
power. This is the moral of the Toyota-Nippon Steel story: oligopsonistic relationships 
allowed the buyer to benefit from competition-driven efficiency gains and avoid lock-in, 
and the seller to benefit from long-term growth of the industry through patent licensing.5 
In such a situation, Toyota acted as a “quality leader” among the oligopsonists, affecting 
the direction and the rate of change of innovation. 
After market structure, the other element influencing the effectiveness of innovation 
procurement in stimulating innovation is the phase of the technological life-cycle. As 
reported in section 3, the procurement decision of early or sophisticated users makes one 
dominant design mature as a product concept. Innovation procurement guarantees the 
critical level of demand necessary to encourage investment in R&D and production. 
Demand pull can also be relevant at a later stage of the technological life-cycle by 
selecting alternative development trajectories (Kuhn, 1962; Dosi, 1982). 
 
5. Public procurement for innovation 
As argued in the previous sections, there are situations in which uncertainty is too high to 
rely upon the producers’ initiative to undertake a welfare increasing innovation without 
the assurance of a demand level sufficient to recover the costs of R&D and production. In 
                                                                    
4
 Another problem is that of timing, as argued in Nilson (1994): “consumers may also try to 
seek out better products, but their search will not coincide with that of the manufacturers. 
Both parties may be aware that technology could be improved, but doing this on a 
competitive, mass-production basis will depend on this kind of coincidence. The problem is 
one of timing! (p. 7 and ff.)”.  
5
 See Kamien and Schwartz (1982) and García-Quevedo et al. (2014) for the importance of 
market growth in stimulating innovation. 
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such cases, innovation procurement can shift the risk on the buyer, through the 
specification of functional requirements and the order of the innovative products. 
However, the market might fail in providing also the demand side mechanisms. Generally 
speaking, this will happen if demand cannot be articulated at a sufficient volume level. 
The possibility for this to occur hinges upon the existence of a buying power that 
presupposes awareness and the ability to interact, among consumers, on the one hand, 
and consumers and producers, on the other hand. 
Based on the analysis of the previous sections, one can distinguish two categories of 
innovation failures stemming from hindrances on the demand side: a) a lack of incentives 
to take the initiative to put an order for innovative products, and b) the failure to reach a 
critical mass of demand. 
An active role of buyers can be hindered by awareness problems, knowledge and 
adoption externalities (network effects, switching costs, etc.), that cause lock-in failures 
(Jaffe et al., 2004; OECD, 2014). Lead (von Hippel, 1986) and experimental (Malerba et al., 
2007) users can determine the commercial success of new products. Their role is 
determined by two factors: the new technology has the characteristics of not 
simultaneously impacting on all potential users (von Hippel, 1986); and some users can 
benefit more than others from the new products (Schmookler, 1966; Mansfield, 1968; 
Utterback and Suarez, 1993). It is easy to envisage situations in which no potential 
adopter has the incentive to switch to a new product. The analysis of the relationship 
between innovation procurement and market structure has shown that this can easily be 
the case in polypsonistic markets for consumer goods. A typical example is energy 
savings technologies (Edquist and Hommen, 1998; Jaffe et al., 2004). Though it could be 
cheaper to reduce energy consumption than to increase energy supply, the return to 
suppliers introducing a new technology may be lower than the return to users. The 
demand side, however, is not organised and cannot articulate a demand for the new 
technology. 
In the case of large scale projects, market demand might not reach the critical level 
necessary to guarantee the repayment of R&D and production costs.  
When also the demand side lacks the incentive to procure innovation, there is scope for 
government intervention. This is the case when the risks of undertaking the innovation 
cannot be shifted onto consumers, either because the scale of the project is too large or 
because of a lack of market generated incentives. 
Generally speaking, a welfare improving innovation will not be undertaken if there is a 
discrepancy between private and social returns.6 The opportunity and effectiveness of 
public procurement should be considered along the dimensions used to analyse private 
procurement (Porter, 1990; Lundvall and Borràs, 1997; Edquist and Hommen, 1998), in 
particular the structure of the demand side and the phase of technological development. 
Public procurement is usually the only case of monopsonistic conditions. As argued 
above, this structure entails the risk of a technological lock-in, especially if it creates a 
                                                                    
6
 One case is the discrepancy between the social discount rate and the private one (De Bonis 
and Spataro, 2005, 2010; Spataro and De Bonis, 2008). 
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monopoly on the supply side and if the monopsonist buys intermediate products to be 
used for production in a nationalised industry (which represents a rationale for 
deregulation). However, it might be a solution in the case of large scale projects, 
guaranteeing a critical mass, especially justifiable if a high level of technical risk is 
associated to a high potential for innovation, especially in an early phase of the 
technological life cycle. The traditional example of successful public procurement for 
innovation is the development of the semiconductor industry in the US on impulse from 
the Department of Defence (Rothwell, 1994). 
Oligopsony is a common condition in public procurement: different branches of 
government can make different procurement decisions and choose different products. 
Also, a public agency can play the role of “quality leader”, for instance acting as an 
experimental user in early stages of product cycles, when technical uncertainty is high 
(Malerba et al., 2207; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2009). 
The public procurer can take the risk of purchasing a new product, especially if endowed 
with the necessary technical competence. Under another perspective, government could 
act as a customer with perfect foresight, willing to incur the costs of buying an inferior 
good today for the benefit of getting better products tomorrow. The best known example 
of this is perhaps the role played by the US Department of Defence in the 1960’s and 
1970’s in the electronic industry. Under this respect, regulation or state ownership can 
play a positive role (to be contrasted with the positive potential effect of deregulation in 
overcoming the drawbacks of monopsonistic power).  
Nevertheless, the positive influence of public procurement on innovation might be lost as 
the product reaches the maturity phase and innovative activity declines, with emphasis 
shifting to cost saving through large scale production (Utterback and Suarez, 1993; 
Faucher and Fitzgibbons, 1993). This is the parable of the US Department of Defence 
intervention in the electronic industry (Kanz, 1993), probably also due to the divergence 
between military and commercial trajectories, to be found also in the experience of other 
sectors (Geroski, 1990; Rothwell, 1994). However, besides technical uncertainty, 
economic uncertainty is also a potential hindrance to innovation, and one should not 
exclude the importance of public procurement also in later stages of the innovation cycle. 
As mentioned above, demand pull might be an important factor in determining new 
evolutionary branches during the diffusion stage (Kuhn, 1962; Dosi, 1982). 
Getting back to demand configuration, it has already been noted that in polypsonistic 
consumer markets the fragmentation of demand involves little incentive for user-
producer relationships, so that risk cannot be shifted onto buyers through procurement 
decisions. Thus, in markets with important societal needs, government might intervene to 
organise demand, through the specification of requirements based on socially desirable 
objectives. Successful examples of this have been the activity of the Japan’s Rental Agency 
(JECC) in the development of the domestic computer market and the NUTEK experience 
in Sweden, addressing the above mentioned pay-back in the case of energy efficiency. 
Again, organising the demand side can represent a more effective policy than 
deregulation, since this emphasises the profit-maximising role of suppliers (Nilson, 1994; 
Edquist and Hommen, 1998). In these cases, public procurement has a catalyst nature, 
the motivation for intervention being stimulating demand rather than improving the 
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provision of a public service. 
Of course, public procurement is not the only public measure for innovation operating on 
the demand side. In the taxonomy proposed by Edler and Gheorgiu (2007), the other 
measures are: systemic policies, regulation, support of private demand. Actually, for 
market risk to be shifted from suppliers to buyers, an instrument might be to provide 
incentives for buyers, particularly in the form of a subsidy to early demand. This might be 
particularly effective when other forms of intervention risk impairing competition among 
suppliers. 
 
6. Pre-commercial public procurement 
Innovation procurement shifts technological and commercial risks from the seller to the 
buyer. When the scale of the project is large and/or obstacles are presents that hinder 
private demand, public procurement can play an important role. The specification of 
technical requirement is a key element of the mechanism. In the context of the phases of 
the innovation process, this happens before commercial (large scale) activities begin. 
The research and innovation life cycle transforming an idea into a final good or service is 
usually divided into four phases (see, among others, European Commission, 2006): phase 
1 consists in the exploration of solutions and feasibility studies; phase 2 covers the R&D 
activities up to the creation of prototypes; in phase 3, R&D is performed to obtain the first 
pre-series batch of pre-commercial volumes of pre-products/services in order to perform 
field test for validation; in phase 4, the production and commercialisation of large scale 
volumes of the product eventually take place. The R&D risk level is typically decreasing 
through the four phases; conventionally (see, for instances, European Commission, 2006), 
it is assumed to take the value “4” at the beginning of the first phase, reaching “0” once 
phase four is completed.  
The assessment of functional specifications takes place between industrial research and 
commercialisation, allowing the results of the former to be shaped into the design of new 
products, including the creation of a prototype, thus reaching a lower risk level, 
compatible with commercialisation. These intermediate phases are usually characterised 
by a lack of private financing, since this usually comes in when a prototype exists. Before 
that, technical risk is too high and a business case is lacking. The innovative process 
might therefore be interrupted, especially in cases in which it is costly to steer solutions 
towards the development of prototypes and the creation of first test products. The 
incapacity of translating top scientific performances into innovative products, the so 
called European paradox, represents a widespread problem of the European economies. 
The risk of committing to buy a yet-to-be-tested new product or service can be too high 
also for a public procurer. This is even truer after the dissolution of state monopolies that 
have historically played the role of first-buyers in partnerships with private firms. An 
instrument tailored to the specific technological phase is PCP. 
Pre- commercial public procurement is a kind of procurement of R&D services by which 
the public procurer shares the risks and the effort to pull R&D activities until the 
production of first-test products. It has thus been defined the “missing link” in the EU 
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innovation cycle (European Commission, 2006). Like public procurement of innovation, 
in general (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012a), one can distinguish between 
direct PCP, when the aim is to better meet the public procurers’ needs, and catalytic PCP, 
when it is aimed at stimulating private demand for innovative goods or services. 
Since it does not entail the procurement of existing products, it has been considered a 
supply-side instrument, rather than a demand-side one (Edquist and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia, 2012b). It is, however, a procurement of services, and therefore 
considered a demand-side policy by the majority of the literature. 
The separation from the commercial phase is appropriate when technological and 
commercial risks are high. Since information improves and uncertainty declines along the 
innovation cycle, separating the initial activities from the rest of the procurement process 
reduces the risk, in particular allowing the public procurer to test the innovative products 
before ordering them. The separation from the commercial phase may, however, reduce 
the incentives for potential suppliers (see below). 
According to the EU law, an essential feature of PCP is the sharing of risks and benefits at 
market conditions between the public procurer and the supplier of R&D services. This 
provides for the exemption from the general prohibition of State aid under article 87 (1) 
of the EC Treaty, if the procedure guarantees competition and transparency.7 
Thus, the main characteristics of PCP are: a) the separation between the R&D phase and 
the phase of the production of commercial products; b) the sharing of risks and benefits 
at market conditions; c) the competitive development in phases (see, for instance, 
Ramboll, 2008): like the US SBIR and the UK SBRI programmes, PCP is a model of 
competitive funnelling. It is a single procedure, with specific contracts for each phase 
(phase one, exploration of solutions; phase two, construction of prototypes; and phase 
three, production of first test series) of the innovation process and two points of 
intermediate evaluation. At the end of phase one and of phase two, the best projects are 
selected and go on to the next step. It is thus a phased process with multiple suppliers. 
The separation from the commercial phase distinguishes PCP from general public 
procurement of innovation: while in the latter case the public agency acts as a lead 
customer by procuring the innovative solutions, the former is a procurement of R&D 
services needed for a technologically demanding solution that does not exist yet. PCP 
allows evaluating alternative solutions, comparing prototypes and validating new designs 
in real field tests, before engaging in tenders for large scale deployment. 
The separation between the procurement of R&D services and the procurement of 
innovative goods thus allows procurers to de-risk large deployment contracts. Moreover, 
the re-opening of competition in the commercial phase ensures the best value for money. 
These two effects are at the advantage of the public procurer, in that they limit the risk 
being shifted from the seller to the buyer. By the same token, however, leaving a 
significant part of the risk on the supply-side, they can discourage participation and thus 
the effective working of competition. The issue recalls the arguments on the connections 
                                                                    
7
 Moreover, art. XV GPA WTO exempts public procurement of R&D services from national 
treatment and non-discrimination obligations, given their pre-commercial nature. 
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between innovation, market power and technological life cycle, tackled in the previous 
sections. 
Moreover, especially in the case of catalytic procurement, the separation from the 
commercial phase might leave a gap between the characteristics of the good obtained in 
the R&D, PCP phase and the quality/price ratio threshold required by the market for 
mass production. This is a case of innovation deadlock: suppliers have reached the 
technological ability to produce innovative goods, but demand is lacking or not 
sufficiently articulated, so that the innovative solutions do not receive the investment 
necessary for commercialisation. Also, obtaining funds is particularly difficult at this 
stage, as it is in the prototyping phase, since public support is no longer available, being 
the product beyond the research phase, and private support is not yet available, the 
product being still in the pre-commercial phase. A typical example is the above 
mentioned case of energy saving technologies. 
In these situations, the announcement that a critical mass of buyers intends to use the 
innovative solutions can trigger-in mass production. The critical mass could be reached 
by bundling private and public procurers. A policy instrument specifically designed to 
address this problem is forward commercial procurement, an instrument developed in the 
UK. The process is articulated in three phases: 1) definition and publication of the 
functional requirements that are common to all buyers (functions, features, price); this 
starts markets consultations that clarify the innovation level the suppliers can reach and 
the critical mass of demand required to foster the necessary investment; 2) an invitation 
to present solutions; 3) if these meet the requirements, large-scale production can start. 
Competition and the presence of more than one firm should guarantee supply, prevent 
monopoly, and ensure better value for money and more creativity, thanks to competition. 
These are advantages for the public procurer and society as a whole. 
However, competition among suppliers can reduce the incentives to participate to the 
procedure. The general interconnections between competition and innovation have been 
exposed above. In the particular case of PCP, analysing these relations should consider 
that the number of firms participating in the procedure will typically be small. This 
suggests that interdependence among rival firms’ decisions should be recognized and, 
therefore, the results of the game theoretical approach literature should be applied. 
According to these, one needs both technical uncertainty and uncorrelated R&D activities 
of each firm in order to have several firms simultaneously trying to innovate. Otherwise, 
there can be at most one innovator (these results were derived by Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 
1980). 
Under this respect, thus, the structure of PCP is compatible with the presence of multiple 
firms, since the procedure presupposes a relevant degree of technical uncertainty and is 
aimed at testing alternative solutions. 
However, there are several obstacles that can hinder the participation of a plurality of 
competing firms. First, the number of producers in the relevant sectors might be small. 
Second, the funds initially available for each participant might be lower than in projects 
without multiple suppliers (in the procurer’s perspective, instead, multiple suppliers can 
mean higher initial costs, that will be recovered with the lower price obtainable under 
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competitive conditions). Then, a disincentive may derive from the possibility that 
business secrets be disclosed to rivals. Finally, because of the separation from the 
commercial phase, the winners of the pre-commercial phase do not necessarily obtain the 
contract for large scale deployment. 
This might imply that the commercial tender is won by a non-innovating firm, 
substantially acting like an imitator. As argued above, the possibility of imitation reduces 
the incentive to innovate. Moreover, along the innovation cycle, two different situations 
have been distinguished: the initial phase, in which the innovator obtains monopoly 
profits being the unique seller of a product, and the phase in which a dominant design has 
emerged, in which the presence of economies of scale typically determines the 
dominance of a large firm. Profits obtained in the first phase might not be a sufficient 
incentive to innovate. 
Thus, in PCP, the possibility that a (large) firm, substantially acting as an imitator, win the 
commercial phase, can discourage participation by innovating firms. This might be 
particularly true for SMEs that might foresee the weaker position vis-à-vis large firms in 
the commercial tender. There are, however, other aspects of the PCP procedure that 
might favour the participation of SMEs (European Commission, 2006). PCP covers the 
innovation cycle until the testing of new products to ensure that they comply with the 
functional requirements requested by procurers. Along the procedure, SMEs can become 
ready for large-scale production. In the perspective by Malerba et al. (2007), they have 
time to develop the product to meet the market quality threshold level, so that PCP can be 
used to break the lock-in deriving from the presence of sophisticated buyers. Moreover, 
PCP allows to gradually increase the financial requirements to perform the task, so that 
SMEs can grow together with the project. 
The obstacles to the presence of a multiplicity of suppliers must be tackled with ad hoc 
measures, since the competitive development is a crucial feature of PCP: each supplier 
should typically maintain their IPRs, so that even those who do not pass to the successive 
phases can exploit the results of their R&D investment; the business plan should be 
reconsidered at the end of each phase, to ensure that all potential benefits are reaped; the 
degree of risk sharing should be differentiated among the different phases, with the 
procurer endorsing most of the costs in the initial phase. 
This brings back to the role of supply and demand in bearing the risk connected to 
innovation. The two polar cases identified in the literature are the supply push and the 
demand pull. The former is the typical one, with the supplier bearing the costs and 
obtaining the benefits from innovating. The latter is technology procurement, where the 
buyer takes the risk, by procuring the innovative good or service. 
With respect to this, PCP is a peculiar solution, which can explain the debate found in the 
literature relative to its configuration either as a supply-side or a demand-side 
instrument. The separation from the commercial phase allows the procurer to take only 
(part of) the risks connected to R&D services. Also, competition among suppliers gives 
the opportunity of evaluating different solutions and to obtain, in the commercial phase, 
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To counterbalance this, producers need to obtain a larger share of the benefits of the 
innovation process. This economic reason, besides the legal restrictions on State aid, 
explains the need for a shared risks-shared benefits approach, centred on the agreements 
on the assignment of IPRs. This element is an important step in the innovation cycle: 
recall that, in one of the most famous examples of private technology procurement, the 
cooperation between Toyota and Nippon Steel, an agreement on the exploitation of 
research results preceded the beginning of large scale production. 
PCP does not involve an exclusive use of research results by the public procurer; instead, 
these are typically shared with suppliers and other shareholders (for instance, another 
public procurer). This feature is directly linked to the fact that research results do not 
consist in a commercial product. 
Benefit-sharing should be an incentive to suppliers to also share risks with the procurer, 
balancing the former’s financial interest with the latter’s interest not to bear the whole 
financial and technological risk. Under this respect, the benefits to the supplier stemming 
from the future commercialisation of the product are a relevant element. When the needs 
of the public procurer are in advance of those of the market, benefit sharing can favour 
the success of the future commercial phase and shorten the time to market of the new 
product. In such instances, the public sector can induce the formation of a lead market. 
Other benefits for the supplier are the opportunity to develop the product according to 
the feedbacks from potential clients and the possibility of cooperating with the public 
sector after the project. 
IPRs are a key benefit of R&D projects and, therefore, of risk benefit sharing. Moreover, 
they are strictly connected to the presence of multiple suppliers and to the other key 
factors of PCP; that is, the bundling of demand,8 the involvement of SMEs, the motivations 
and capacities of the public procurer, the technical dialogue between the public procurer 
and potential suppliers9 and the financing strategy.10 
All these factors are strictly interrelated. The choice of the IPRs strategy is a good 
perspective to analyse them. 
 
7. The IPRs strategy 
The problem of the assignment of IPRs can be identified with respect to its two extreme 
solutions: a) assigning IPRs to the supplier involves the risk of a vendor lock-in situation 
for the procurer, who has paid the good/service development costs; b) assigning the IPRs 
to the procurer reduces the incentives to innovate and to share risks, not allowing the 
supplier to exploit the innovation in the markets; the issue is clearly connected to the 
                                                                    
8
 Bundling of demand reduces risks and costs for the single procurer; allows sharing 
knowledge; can favour the creation of a lead market, if the critical mass level is reached. It 
however involves coordination costs. 
9
 The lack of technical dialogue has been considered among the reasons of the failure of the 
first version of SBRI in the UK. 
10
 Government could support the creation of a venture capital fund dedicated to PCP, 
especially to support the participation of SMEs. 
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distinction between direct and catalytic procurement, which can, on turn, be connected to 
the different nature, public or private, of the goods or services procured: in the former 
case, one cannot foresee a commercialisation independently of public demand. 
IPRs sharing can ensure to meet both the public procurer’s and the supplier’s 
fundamentals needs. The procurer should be able to freely apply the innovation, directly 
using it or licensing it to other producers to guarantee competition; the supplier should 
be able to commercially exploit it with other customers. 
In PCP, IPRs are attributed either to the procurer or to the supplier in a non-exclusive 
way. In the first case, the public procurer does not keep exclusive IPRs, but allows the 
supplier to commercialise products, thus obtaining risk sharing, through a price 
reduction or participation in the costs of managing IPRs. In the second case, as in the US 
SBIR, the procurer keeps the right to freely use the innovation or to license it to third 
parties (or to require the supplier to license it to third parties at market conditions). 
The degree of sharing should depend on the contribution that each party has given to the 
development of the innovation and on the ability to exploit IPRs. In general, the more 
innovative the solution and the larger the investment required, or the highest the 
probability of commercial exploitation and future improvements, the more IPRs should 
be left with the market. Instead, the higher the risk of vendor lock-in and uncertainty, the 
more IPRs should be left with the public procurer.  
There are two main instruments for sharing IPRs: licences and royalties. The 
management of IPRs has repercussions on the competitive nature of PCP. 
First, the application to the tender is probably a work protected by copyright itself. It is 
thus important for the procurer to be allowed to copy and use it to carry out the 
procedure. For instance, in the Austrian Asfinag, R&D services were totally financed by 
the administration, in exchange for the right to publish the results. As for the UK, in the 
ETI project, all information could be published, unless protected by a patent; in the DECC 
project, the procurer was allowed to publish information, together with data and results. 
As for the IPRs that result from the project (foreground IPRs), the strategy depends upon 
the procurer’s objective, that is, whether it wants to directly use them or control their 
protection and exploitation. The most used approaches in PCP are the following:  
1) Non-exclusive licences; this is the most common approach. The procurer has a royalty-
free, non-exclusive license; the supplier can use IPRs or license them to third parties.  
2) Exclusive licences: only the public procurer can use the IPRs; it is not the right 
instrument if the administration intends to share the IPRs with the market. 
3) Open licenses with royalty payment: the public procurer can use the IPRs for new 
projects and sub-license them, but they remain with the supplier and the public procurer 
pays royalties for each use. An example is the Dutch Civil Engineering Programme, a 
general agreement for the use of open licences in civil engineering works for the public 
sector in the Netherlands. The administration can maintain, repair, modify and demolish 
the works; it can apply innovations to new works subject to the payment of royalties; and 
stipulate contracts with other suppliers. Suppliers have the IPRs and can recoup the 
investment costs by using them in new works with the public administration or other 
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procurers and obtaining royalty payments. A particular case is the open source software 
licence, which grants the licensee a wide liberty of use; the public procurer can choose it 
when aiming at giving open access to the IPRs, in the meantime keeping the paternity of 
the solution for the supplier or for itself. 
Of course, the participation to the tender is less attractive if fewer rights are granted to 
the supplier. From the public procurer’s point of view, the right to use the innovation, to 
let other parties use it and to obtain a return for letting other use it are granted both by 
entitling the public procurer with the IPRs and by leaving them with the supplier, but 
granting the public procurer a licence. 
The procurer’s intent to limit the use of the innovation by third parties is obtained by 
assigning the IPRs to the public procurer or by assigning it to the supplier, but granting 
the public procurer with an exclusive licence. The public procurers have the right to 
patent the innovation only if the IPRs are assigned to them. 
Some practical solutions can illustrate these arguments. The ETI is a public-private 
partnership among the UK government and eleven companies in the energy sector. The 
aim is to meet a grand societal challenge. Economic benefits are assigned based on 
individual contributions, valued at market prices. In particular, the public procurer 
finances the research services and IPRs are assigned to ETI in a non-exclusive way. 
Another example is that of the NHS (National Health Service)-NIC (National Innovation 
Centre), using PCP to directly address a need of the public administration. According to 
the desired participation level, one can have contracts with the IPRs being assigned to the 
NHS or contracts in which they are assigned to the suppliers. In the bioenergy DECC 
project, suppliers have the forward IPRs and must identify and protect patentable 
knowledge within a given time (three years); the procurer is granted a royalty-free, non-
exclusive licence. First-test series belong to the suppliers. 
In the Italian Arca project, IPRs are assigned to the supplier. The procurer can use the 
results for internal use, but must wait five months before implementing the commercial 
tender to allow the suppliers to protect their rights. In the case of vendor lock-in, the 
administration can ask the supplier to licence third parties at “equitable and fair” market 
conditions. The public procurer receives a financial compensation in the form of a 1% 
participation to the revenues obtained in the future by the supplier and licensee 
companies. Again in Italy, in the case of Regione Piemonte, IPRs are assigned in an 
exclusive way to the party that has autonomously developed the innovation, while 
property is common for those jointly developed. Transfers to third parties at market 
conditions must be agreed upon by both parties. In both projects the supplier must take 
care of the registration of patents. If the supplier does not fulfil the obligation, the public 
procurer can freely obtain the ownership.  
Finally, one should consider that, in order to implement the innovative solution, in some 
cases it might be necessary to use IPRs developed independently of the PCP procedure, 
the so called background IPRs. Of course, they should be licensed to the public procurer, 
who can ask the applicants to reveal any background IPRs they know to be necessary to 
implement the solution. Should they belong to third parties, the need to obtain a licence 
should be taken into account when awarding the contract. 
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The initiative of innovation usually rests with the producer, who anticipates monopoly 
profits for being the unique seller of the new good. There are, however, situations in 
which uncertainty is so high that welfare increasing innovation activities are not 
undertaken in the lack of the assurance of future demand at a level high enough to 
recover R&D and production costs. In such cases, innovation procurement can shift the 
risk onto the buyers, through the specification of technical requirements and the 
commitment to buy the new product. However, also the demand side mechanism will not 
operate, if incentives to take the initiative are lacking or the critical level of demand is not 
reached. 
In these situations, there is scope for government intervention. But the risk of committing 
to buy a yet-to-be-tested new product could be too high also for the public procurer. PCP, 
the procurement of R&D services by which the risks and the costs of R&D activities until 
the production of first-test products are shared between the public procurers and the 
suppliers, can be a solution. The separation from the commercial phase allows the 
procurer to test the innovative product before ordering it in commercial volumes.  
The instrument appears appropriate, if one considers that the assessment of functional 
requirements takes place between basic research and commercialisation, in a phase 
characterised by a lack of private financing. It can, thus, potentially avoid the interruption 
of the innovation process, a cause of the so-called European paradox, that is, the inability 
of translating scientific and technological leadership into the commercialisation of new 
products. 
The separation between pre-commercial and commercial procurement thus allows 
overcoming the risk of large deployment contracts. Moreover, it also allows re-opening 
competition in the commercial phase, ensuring lower prices.  
This element, as well as the presence of multiple suppliers in the pre-commercial phase, 
can discourage participation (even if the structure of PCP is in principle compatible with 
the presence of multiple firms, since the procedure presupposes a relevant degree of 
technical uncertainty and is aimed at testing alternative solutions). This is even truer 
because of the possibility that a (large) firm, substantially acting as an imitator, 
eventually win the commercial tender. 
To counterbalance all this, suppliers must obtain a larger share of the benefits than in 
usual procurement. This explains why PCP is a shared risks – shared benefits approach, 
besides the legal restrictions on State aid. 
The key instrument of benefit-sharing is the management of IPRs. Their sharing can 
allow, on the one hand, the procurer to freely use the innovation and guarantee 
competition and, on the other hand, the supplier to commercially exploit it with other 
customers. The degree of sharing should depend on the contributions that the parties 
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The separation from the commercial phase marks the strength, but also the weakness of 
PCP. Especially in the case of catalytic procurement, a gap might remain between the 
characteristics of the prototype and the market requirements; private demand might 
remain unarticulated; private funding is still not available, being the product in the pre-
commercial phase.  
A remedy to this could be joining PCP with a policy instrument that bundles private and 
public demand; an example is forward commercial procurement. In other cases, 
subsidising buyers could be a more effective instrument than procurement, allowing risk 
to be shifted from suppliers to buyers, especially if PCP cannot guarantee an effective 
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